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The upcoming presidential election set for 2015 dominated political discussion. The 
ruling elite clearly lacked the will for constitutional and electoral reforms, which the 
opposition, civil society and international donors regarded as precondition for free and 
fair polls. The donor community nevertheless increased their aid because of concerns 
about growing instability and terrorism in the sub-region and Togo’s role as a willing 
supplier of troops for UN-missions. Promising growth prospects were overshadowed by 
increasing poverty, inequality and youth unemployment.  
 
 
Domestic Politics  
 
Urgently needed reforms of electoral institutions and the constitutional framework in 
the run-up to the upcoming presidential election in March/April 2015 dominated 
political discussions throughout the year. The inter-party dialogue ‘Cadre Permanent de 
Dialogue et de Concertation’, begun in 2009 between government and opposition but 
suspended since 2012, formally resumed on 19 May. Because of irreconcilable 
differences, the talks between the two camps stalled again in early June. Correcting the 
biased electoral system was one of the opposition’s most salient demands for electoral 
reform prior to the next election. The political accord of 2006 (‘Accord Politique 
Global’, APG) had endorsed a return to the 1992 constitutional two-term limit on 
incumbent presidents and its implementation would have put an end to 47 years of 
autocratic rule by the Gnassingbé clan. The government accepted the APG in principle 
but wanted to apply the constitutional term-limit only from 2015 onwards, enabling 
Faure Gnassingbé to remain in office for a third and ultimately also a fourth term.  
After the break-down of the interparty dialogue, the government of Prime 
Minister Ahoomey-Zumu, in a surprise move on 24 June, tabled a draft reform bill in 
order to accommodate some of the opposition’s key demands. The bill envisaged 
(among other things) a partial return to the 1992 Constitution (adapted to the needs of 
the ruling Eyadéma regime in a ‘constitutional coup’ of 2002) by re-establishing a 
presidential term limit and a return to a two-round majority system for presidential 
elections. Further proposals included the institution of a second chamber, the Senate 
(already provided for in the Constitution but never established), a reform of the 
Constitutional Court, a redefinition of the prerogatives of the prime minister and new 
conditions for eligibility for the presidency. Although the bill did not meet all the 
opposition’s demands, notably the limitation on the presidential mandate with 
retroactive effect, the opposition was nevertheless ready to enter into negotiations with 
the government. In fact, this coup stunned not only the opposition and the general 
public but also international donors, who acted as facilitators of the dialogue. However, 
only one week later it appeared that the government’s initiative was yet another trick to 
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outmanoeuvre the opposition and not a genuine offer. On 30 June, the majority of the 
ruling ‘Union pour la République’ (UNIR) in parliament voted against its own 
president’s draft bill, while the opposition voted in favour.  
But if the president had surmised that the opposition and the international 
community would nevertheless recognise him as a moderniser who was impeded by 
hardliners in his own party, his plan did not work. The stance of the major donors (the 
G5, i.e. France, Germany, US, EU, UNDP) vis à vis the government hardened. Thus the 
G5’s support for a consensus and for the APG meant that the donors de facto supported 
the opposition.  
The stalemate following the imbroglio in parliament went on for months. In a 
joint statement on 1 October, Togo’s three churches (Catholic, Presbyterian and 
Methodist) appealed to the political actors to resume the dialogue. The churches also 
decried the fact that the parliamentary majority had rejected the bill drafted by the ruling 
party. Ten days later the donor communities supported the churches’ joint stance 
Minister for Territorial Administration and Decentralization Gilbert Bawara, 
who was responsible for the organisation of elections, responded by asserting that 
electoral reforms could not be carried out before the 2015 presidential election. He was 
seconded by the president of the Constitutional Court, Aboudou Assouma, who, on 5 
October, declared the APG void. Assouma referred to the advent of a functioning 
pluralist parliament and stated that “the page of reforms had been turned definitely since 
30 June by the refusal of the parliamentary majority of the draft reform bill”. This 
statement of the most senior judge in the land reinforced once more the lack of trust on 
the part of the opposition and civil society in the impartiality of the justice system. 
Shortly before, in mid-September the head of state and his UNIR parliamentary 
majority, had re-elected largely the same (seven of nine) notorious judges as members 
of the Constitutional Court who had been chosen for the same posts in 2007. The 
president himself, on a state visit to Accra (Ghana) on 25 November), reaffirmed that 
the Constitution (of 2002) would be rigorously respected in the run-up to the 2015 
presidential election, thus indirectly refusing to commit to any reforms before that 
election. Instead he proposed to put in place a new expert commission with a mandate 
to elaborate on proposals for political reforms. In so doing, he neutralised the mandate 
of the already established Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) of Mgr 
Barrigah, which had already tabled its proposals on these issues. In early April, the 
government itself had adopted a draft bill for a White Book concerning the 
implementation of the 68 recommendations for reconciliation based on the CVJR’s final 
report, issued in 2012. In October, 26 local development projects througout the country 
were identified, on the basis of CVJR recommendations, within the framework of the 
‘Projet d’Appui à la Société Civile et à la Réconciliation Nationale’ (founded in 2012) 
in collaboration with the EU and local civil society organisations. 
In line with the president’s attempts to move the debate about critical election 
issues into commissions, Bawara, the minister responsible for election organisation, had 
appointed on 21 October an expert committee to develop a roadmap for the local 
elections. This had been postponed several times since the last elections in 1987 due to 
the ruling elite’s lack of political will to devolve powers to the regions and districts. The 
government also feared that it might lose ground to the opposition in the urban centres 
and the south. Shortly before, Prime Minister Ahoomey-Zunu had ruled out local 
elections taking place before the upcoming 2015 presidential election.  
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On 17 September, parliament nominated the 17 members of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (CENI), without any major disagreement between 
government and opposition. However, the nomination of the expert committee, 
including the re-nomination by the ruling party of former CENI-chef Taffa Tabiou 
(UNIR) as CENI president proved much more controversial. This was a strategy of the 
government to maintain its hold over the CENI.  
A national uprising at the end of October against President Compaoré in 
neighbouring Burkina Faso after 27 years of autocratic rule encouraged the Togolese 
opposition in turn to take a firmer stand against the ruling regime. It caused the 
opposition alliance, Arc-en-Ciel, to end its quarrels with the more radical ‘Collectif 
Sauvons le Togo’ to create a common opposition alliance called ‘Combat pour 
l’Alternative Politique en 2015’ (CAP 2015). On 31 October, the two parties agreed to 
nominate Jean-Pierre Fabre, the head of the main opposition party, ‘Alliance Nationale 
pour le Changement’ (ANC), as the sole opposition candidate in the upcoming 
presidential election. According to Afrobarometer data in October, about two-thirds of 
the population thought that the current electoral system allowed the electorate neither to 
vote the president out of office nor to vote for deputies who reflected their will.  
The reorganisation of the military continued in December with the aim of 
reinforcing the power of the head of state vis-à-vis hardliners within his own ranks. Two 
battalions of a Rapid Intervention Force had already been created by presidential decree 
on 9 October. Raymond Germanos, Gnassingbé’s dubious military advisor, a retired 
French five-star general, supervised the establishment of these battalions, which 
consisted of 550 well-equipped troops with headquarters in Lomé and Kara. Colonel 
Awoki Panassa, former head of the National Gendarmerie, became the president’s chief 
of staff, replacing Néyo Takougnadi, who became the head of the National Navy. A 
fundamental reform of the National Gendarmerie, with the creation of two regional 
directorates, was announced at the same time. Yotroféi Massina, the chef of the 
controversial intelligence agency (‘Agence Nationale de Renseignements’), accused of 
torture in 2012 by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), became head of 
the Gendarmerie. In mid-October, the protection of the electoral process, which had 
been hitherto the task of the national police under the command of the minister in 
charge of security and civil protection, Colonel Yark Daméhame, was transferred to the 
Ministry of Defence and thus de facto to the head of state himself. In addition, a special 
force (‘Force Sécurité Élection Présidentielle’, FOSEP 2015) composed of elements of 
the gendarmerie and the police was created to secure the presidential election, as in 
previous elections. 
Corruption, money laundering and illicit financial flows continued to influence 
domestic politics. Lomé attracted all sorts of merchandise from all over central Africa, 
such as ivory (four tons in January alone), which was then re-exported clandestinely in 
huge quantities to Vietnam and China. According to a report by the US non-profit think 
tank Global Financial Integrity, published in April and put before the general public in 
Togo in August by the ANC, illicit outflows from Togo averaged $ 1,847 bn between 
2002 and 2011, with a peak in 2008 when it amounted to 160% of GDP, more than four 
times the state budget. The ANC was quick to point to the Gnassingbé regime as the 
main beneficiary, claiming that this explained its reluctance to implement political 
reforms.  
In September, ECOWAS launched a maritime piloting zone to fight piracy in 
the coastal waters of Nigeria, Benin and Togo. The deep water harbour of Lomé 
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emerged as the primary African destination for US petroleum exports, partly as a way to 
thwart pirates.  
The human rights situation remained precarious Although Togo’s Freedom 
House rating improved from ‘not free’ in previous years to ‘partly free’, this was mainly 
due to the peaceful conduct of the 2013 legislative elections. The elections were free, 
but not fair. On the democracy index of the Economist Intelligence Unit for 2013, Togo 
had improved by two places compared with 2012 to rank 128th out of 167 countries. 
However, Togo’s low score of 3.45 out of 10 remained unchanged and the country thus 
continued to be classed as an ‘authoritarian regime’. In the ranking of the Paris based 
Reporters Without Borders, Togo improved from 83rd out of 179 countries in 2013 to 
76th. A delegation of the New York-based Parliamentarians for Global Action visited 
Togo at the end of June. The purpose of the trip was to persuade the government to sign 
up to the ICC in The Hague. The mission failed and Togo thus remained the only 
ECOWAS member that is not a member of the ICC.  
Urban centres were characterised by an increasing lack of security. A series of 
murders took place in Lomé: for example, on 28 September, a group of traders on their 
way to China were ambushed at the airport by robbers, who made off with about 
€ 4.5 m in cash. Deplorable prison conditions attracted international attention. 
According to a report by the US-based Open Society-Justice Initiative published on 1 
September, Togo counted among the 20 countries worldwide with the highest 
percentage of pre-trial detainees, amounting to 65% of the total prison population in 
2012. Detainees were housed in prison cells of about 35-50 m
2
, which held up to 55 
inmates, and had to rely on their families for basic food and drinking water. Prison staff 
delegated much of their authority to trusties, who effectively controlled and terrorised 
their co-inmates. Torture to extract confession remained widespread at police and 
gendarmerie stations.  
 
 
Foreign Affairs  
 
On a visit to Lomé on 27 November, the UN’s West African special envoy, Mohamed 
Ibn Chambas, urged all political players to reach a consensus on the presidential term 
limits. He thus reconfirmed the position of the international donor community, notably 
that of the EU, whose representative in Lomé, Nicolàs Berlanga-Martinez, had 
underlined on 10 July that, contrary to the Gnassingbé government, the EU was not of 
the opinion that the reform question was off the table.  
Nevertheless, major donors increased their support for Togo because of 
geostrategic considerations: Togo supports regional peace-keeping operations, e.g. as a 
troop provider. In October 2013, the EU had already agreed to raise its financial support 
to $ 292 m for the funding period 2014-20 within the framework of the 11th EDF. This 
constituted an increase of 70% compared with the previous period (2008-13). Within 
this framework, the EU signed a National Indicative Programme on 10 October, which 
provided € 216 m for state consolidation and security, water, sanitation and energy. 
Another € 16.7 m of EU budget support had been already approved in February. 
Germany nearly doubled its aid to € 40 m for two years (2014-15) on 5 June. In July, 
IFAD provided a loan of $ 39.6 m to promote rural entrepreneurship. The World Bank, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and IDA approved $ 40 m 
for operations in 2014. The first IMF-financed three-year ECF, which had expired in 
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2011, was not extended, due to Togo’s reluctance to implement IMF recommendations. 
In July, the US entered into a military State Partnership Program aimed at internal and 
border security, in addition to a $ 1.8 m construction and humanitarian assistance US 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) programme. The US-Africa Leaders’ Summit in 
Washington DC on 4-6 August, hosted by president Obama and attended by leaders 
from 50 African states, among them the Togolese president, focussed on ‘aid by trade’, 
investment and international security. One of the key issues was the extension of 
AGOA, due to expire in September 2015, but the US Congress would not make a 
decision till 2015 at the earliest. France, which was still keen to keep its special 
relationship with Francophone Africa, followed the line of the EU, UNDP, Germany 
and the USA and insisted on political reforms before the 2015 presidential election. 
Paris continued its aid and military assistance programme, including the provision in 
July of urban guerrilla warfare equipment for the Togolese army in order to enhance its 
peacekeeping capabilities. China continued its economic cooperation, with major 
infrastructure projects financed by Chinese aid, e.g. the construction of a new Lomé 
international airport ($ 141 m), with double the capacity of the former airport, by the 
China Airport Construction Group, which was completed on 25 December. 
Apart from aid, remittances from the Togolese diaspora played a significant 
role in development, although there was no apparent link between remittances and 
economic growth. According to OECD statistics, Togo ranked high on a global scale 
both for ODA per capita ($ 91 in 2011, ranked 17th) and remittances per capita ($ 52 in 
2011, ranked 7th), together amounting to franc CFA 182 bn ($ 333 m) in 2014. 
Negotiations on the controversial EU-West African EPAs, which had dragged 
on since 2002, were increasingly under pressure by the EU, which wanted to sign the 
agreement by 1 October at the latest. African civil society organisations and churches, 
including the secretary general of the Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in 
West Africa, the Liberian Rev. Dr Tolbert T. Jallah, a well-known anti-EPA 
campaigner, cautioned ECOWAS against premature conclusions and criticised the 
secrecy surrounding the negotiations. Despite the pressure applied on all ECOWAS 
members to sign the EPAs, at least five countries, among them Nigeria and Togo, 
refused to do so, even though the ECOWAS head of states had endorsed the 
negotiations at the ECOWAS 45th ordinary session in Accra (Ghana) on 10 July.  
The Ebola pandemic posed a new risk to Togo. In early October, epidemiology 
studies carried out by North-Eastern University in Boston (MA, USA) and Oxford 
University placed Togo among the ten African countries most likely to be exposed to an 
outbreak of Ebola. Shortly before, China had granted $ 0.8 m for Togo to buy Ebola 
screening equipment. During an extraordinary ECOWAS meeting in Accra on 6 
November, which focused on Ebola, Faure Gnassingbé was elected ECOWAS 
coordinator of Ebola related activities. At a West African Economic and Monetary 
Union summit in Lomé shortly before (on 25 September), member states had been 
urged to reinforce the health system in order to prevent the spread of the fever. 
 
 
Socioeconomic Developments  
 
Economic growth remained promising. The annual growth rate was expected to stand at 
6.0% in 2014 and 6.3% in 2015, the increase being largely the result of heavy assistance 
by the international donor community. Because of falling global oil and food prices, 
Author’s annotated and extended version of: Kohnert, D: Togo. In: Melber/Mehler/Walraven (eds.), 
Africa Yearbook. Vol. 11 – Politics, economy and society South of the Sahara in 2014. Leiden & Boston: 
Brill, 2015: 164 - 171  
 
6 
 
inflation remained well below 3%, despite a rise in domestic fuel prices in January. This 
was the result of government efforts to reduce subsidies. In February, the government 
finally established a new and more efficient revenue authority (‘Office Togolais des 
Recettes’), thereby merging customs and tax directorates, a measure that had been 
delayed since December 2012. Overdue privatisation of parastatals remained an issue 
and suffered from lack of transparency. Two of four state-owned banks still remained to 
be sold and the tender to sell the phosphate mines (‘Société Nouvelle des Phosphates de 
Togo’ joint-venture) was still pending at the end of year. Ailing phosphate production 
increased by 3.4% to 900,000 tonnes in 2013. Cotton production, the most important 
cash crop managed by the ‘Nouvelle Société Cotonnière du Togo’, fell by 18% 
compared with the previous cropping season to 67,000 tonnes in 2013/14. Major 
investments included the extension of the deep water port of Lomé by a third container 
terminal, financed with € 457 m by the French Bolloré group. The extension was 
completed in October and allowed for the processing of 1.2 m containers per year. A 
supplementary fourth private container terminal was also nearing completion. Its even 
bigger capacity of 2.2 m containers meant that Togo would now serve as a logistical 
hub for the West African coast. The extension was the result of a Chinese-Dutch joint-
venture with an overall cost of $ 420 m financed in conjunction with the IFC which 
acted as facilitator. Other projects included road construction and the huge $ 250 m 
clinker and cement grinding plant under construction by German HeidelbergCement. 
From 2015, up to 1.5 m tonnes of clinker a year would be produced in Tabligbo, 80 km 
north-east of Lomé, and up to 200,000 tonnes of cement per year from 2016 in Dapaong 
in the far north.  
The current account deficit remained high (13.4% of GDP) because of growing 
public investment, which in turn resulted in higher imports, while exports of major 
foreign exchange earners and transfer inflows lagged behind. Because of high public 
investment and election-related expenses, the fiscal deficit was forecast to increase from 
5.6% of GDP in 2014 to 5.9% of GDP in 2015. 
According to an IMF poverty reduction strategy paper published in July, the 
government’s ‘Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment’ (SCAPE, 
2013-17), focused too much on the coastal region and was unsustainable because of 
high vulnerability to external shocks. The IMF further claimed that the programme was 
not inclusive of the country as a whole and had led to regional inequality and an 
increase in extreme poverty. Despite a small drop in monetary poverty since 2006, the 
depth and severity of poverty increased. About 81% of the population were vulnerable 
to falling into the poverty trap. The regional distribution varied from 91% of people 
living below the poverty line in the northern Savanes region to 33% in Lomé. 
Youth unemployment continued to be a concern to the government because of 
its potential political repercussions. The programme for unemployed school leavers 
(PROVONAT – ‘Programme de Promotion du Volontariat au Togo’, backed by 
UNDP) became in June the ‘Agence Nationale de Volontariat au Togo’. According to 
official figures, about 65% of Togolese school leavers did not find employment. Up to 
4,280 volunteers had participated in the PROVONAT programme since 2011 and 44% 
of its participants found employment.  
The ambitious budget (franc CFA 815.9 bn) for 2015 was adopted by 
parliament on 30 December, with the opposition voting against. The increase of 12% 
over the 2014 budget was justified by citing fiscal reforms and promising economic 
growth perspectives. The opposition accused the government of wishful thinking and 
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argued that the 2014 budget had already suffered from a budget shortfall of 13%. The 
IMF had warned the government in May to control the growing public debt, especially 
external debt, which was forecast to reach 22% of GDP by 2016. African traditional 
religions, notably vodun in the southern regions and occult beliefs throughout Togo, 
continued to play an important role in everyday life, with priests often acting as conflict 
mediators at the local level. In October, ‘Jeune Afrique’ named Ni-Mantche, the grand 
master of the vodun goodness Maman Kole in southern Togo, as one of the 15 most 
influential religious leaders in Africa and one of the most celebrated African vodun 
priests. 
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